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I. ARGUMENTS IN REPLY
A.

Mid-Century’s Arguments Rely on Assumptions it is not Entitled to on Summary
Judgment
Defendant Mid-Century’s response wrongfully interprets facts in its own favor and ignores

I.R.C.P. 56 and Idaho case law on summary judgment review. Idaho law is clear, a reviewing court
must “liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,
drawing all inferences and conclusions in that party's favor, and if reasonable people could reach
different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences then an order granting summary judgment must
be reversed.” State Dep't of Agric. ex rel. Commodity Indem. Fund v. Curry Bean Co. Inc., 139 Idaho
789, 792, 86 P.3d 503, 506 (2004) quoting Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho
851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 (1996).
Mid-Century’s response brief relies on their assumption that surface water was the cause of
loss. At summary judgment, it is improper based on the record of this case, to definitively state that
it was in fact surface water. It is improper to assume that it was surface water that damaged the
valves and riser caps when Don Boyd, who physically inspected the vales and riser caps come to the
“conclusion that water was entering the tank from below grade of the spill bucket.” R. 231. This
evidence was before the district court. This evidence contradicts the surface water theory because
it could have been ground water that came up from below, froze and damaged the valves, riser caps
and seals and then allowed surface water to also infiltrate the tank.
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Don Boyd was present when work was being completed on the tanks, and his opinion was
mixed on whether or not it was surface water or ground water which creates question of fact. MidCentury’s expert, Tim Hurley, did not ever go out to inspect the tanks. He only did a desk review.
He opined that surface water could enter through cracks in the riser caps and spill buckets if they
were in disrepair and if surface water was puddling above the caps. R. 227. Tim Hurley presents
no evidence that there was puddling above the caps or that water did enter.
Tim Hurley could not present any such evidence because he never was present on the
property to see what the conditions were. His failure to actually appear on site is also why Tim
Hurley stated “it is noted that the precise reason that phase separation was detected after CDASSE
performed the product line cleaning on January 24th is not known at this time.” R. 227. The
admitted fact that Mid-Century’s own expert cannot explain how or why water continued to get into
the tanks after repairs were made is a precise reason summary judgment should not have been
granted, there remained a question of fact as to how water continued to get into the tanks.
Replacing the riser and caps would have resolved the surface water issue but water continued
to get in. R. 227. If the cause of the water infilitration was the crack in the bottom of the spill
bucket, then the logical inference is that it was ground water that was infiltrating the tanks, which
is what Don Boyd concluded. For the same reasons the court was unable to determine whether it was
faulty maintenance, the district court should have denied summary judgment on whether surface
water was the cause of loss.
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The statements from Don Boyd, Tim Hurley and the continued intrusion of water after repairs
were made is far more than a scintilla of evidence to preclude summary judgment. There is no
additional report or opinion by Tim Hurley that later provides an explanation for the phase separation
after the repairs. Tim Hurley’s opinion is based solely on the opinion and observations of Don Boyd,
and cannot hold greater weight than Don Boyd’s opinion. Don Boyd was actually present to review
the conditions on the ground and to make the necessary repairs. He stated “conclusion that water
was entering the tank from below grade of the spill bucket” should be given greater weight not only
because he was physically present but also because on summary judgment any inference is
interpreted in favor of the non-moving party. R. 231; 139 Idaho at 792.

A jury could conclude,

based on the statements from Don Boyd, Tim Hurley and the continued intrusion of water after
repairs were made that it was ground water and not surface water that caused the loss.
A summary judgment dismissal cannot be based on Tim Hurley’s opinion because he stated
“[I]t is noted that the precise reason that phase separation was detected after CDASSE performed
the product line cleaning on January 24th is not known.” R. 227. A summary judgment dismissal
cannot be based on Don Boyd’s opinion because he stated “It is our understanding the Unlead (sic)
tank settled down and stayed water free coming to the conclusion that water was entering the tank
from below grade of the spill bucket.” R. 231 A summary judgment dismissal cannot be based on
the presence of surface water because, after the initial repairs were completed that eliminated access
of surface water, there was still water getting into the tanks causing phase separation.

3

If the record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might reach
different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because all doubts are to be resolved
against the moving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). It was
inappropriate to grant summary judgment to dismiss this case based on the facts in the record.
B.

There is No Evidence in the Record to Support Mid-Century’s Argument that Ground
Water is Surface Water
Mid-Century’s additional arguments continues to require a fact finder to assume that any

ground water is/or was surface water. The fact that the moving party at summary judgment is
resorting to an assumption that all surface water is ground water is direct evidence that granting the
summary judgment was improper. An assumption is a disputed fact. There is no expert opinion in
the record to support Mid-Century’s assumption. Without expert opinion the court has no basis to
support the assumption. It is also notable that Mid-Century’s assumption is in contradiction with
its own insurance agreement.
The agreement distinguishes between types of water (i.e. ground water vs. surface water)
which means that there are differences between the two. If all surface water was ground water, as
they now argue, then there would be no need for Mid-Century to have distinguish between the two
types of water in its own agreement. Clearly by distinguishing between the two they must be treated
differently.
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Mid-Century drafted its agreement and any ambiguities therein are construed liberally in
favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved against the insurer. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.
v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 92, 73 P.3d 102, 105 (2003). The ambiguity present in this case involves
the phrase “other openings” as used in the ground water exclusion “(4) Water under the ground
surface pressing on, or flowing or seeping through: (a) Foundations, walls, floors, or paved surfaces;
(b) Basements, whether paved or not; or (c) doors, windows, or other openings.” R. 81. The phrase
other openings is not defined in the agreement. The term is so broad that it is ambiguous.
When interpreting insurance policies, reviewing courts apply the general rules of contract law
subject to certain special canons of construction. Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho
459, 461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008). The ambiguity in this case requires the court to construe the
term “other openings” liberally in favor of recovery by the insured. This would include applying the
special canon of construction noscitur a sociis to analyze the words used in the insurance agreement.
As previously noted courts in other jurisdictions have done so in the interest of promoting recovery
by the insured. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carr, 215 Kan. 591, 596, 528 P.2d 134, 138
(1974), M & M Holdings, Inc. v. State Auto Property and Cas., Ins. Co. 2007 WL 1531843 (U.S.
Dist. Court, D. Kansas). Applying this canon of construction would be consistent with Idaho’s intent
that “an insurance contract is to be construed most favorably to the insured and in such a manner as
to provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow protection. The Courts do not
sanction a construction of the insurer's language that will defeat the very purpose or object of the
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insurance.” Erikson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 97 Idaho 288, 292, 543 P.2d 841,
845 (1975).
It is also appropriate to apply noscitur a sociis in this case because Mid-Century bears the
burden at summary judgment to establish that an exclusion applies. Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 100, 103, 936 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). Resorting to the
cliche “which came first the chicken or the egg,” Mid-Century has the burden to prove whether it
was the chicken or the egg. If an exclusion applies, Mid-Century has the burden to prove whether
it applied and whether the exclusion started the loss. Whether it was the chicken or the egg, and
whether it was surface water or ground water, cannot be determined on summary judgment as there
will always remain a question of fact. Following a trial when all of the facts are laid out equally
before the finder of fact then a decision can be made. A decision on either question cannot be made
at summary judgment.
C.

The Weather Exclusion Cannot Apply When There are Questions of Fact Regarding
the Other Exclusions
The language of the policy is clear, the weather exclusion “only applies if weather conditions

contribute in any way with a cause or event excluded in Paragraph 1 above to produce the loss or
damage.” R. 83. Mid-Century acknowledges in its brief “ABK is correct that the Weather
Conditions exclusion only applies if weather conditions contribute in any way with, relevant here,
a cause or event excluded [by the policy].” Respondent’s Brief, p. 19. As discussed above, there
are questions of fact regarding the surface water and ground water exclusions. The district court also
6

found that there were questions of fact regarding the maintenance and wear and tear exclusions.
These questions of fact preclude application of the weather exclusion because it cannot act as a stand
alone exclusion. With the questions of fact present in the record it was error for the district court to
grant summary judgment based on the weather exclusion.
D.

The Issue of Efficient Proximate Cause was Argued and Preserved for Appeal
Efficient proximate cause was raised in the briefings and during oral argument. Efficient

proximate cause was raised in ABK’s response to summary judgment during the discussion of the
ensuing loss provision. R. 138-141. It was then raised again in the motion for reconsideration. R.,
p. 306-308. Mid-Century did not object to any discussion on efficient proximate cause during
reconsideration. Mid-Century actually discussed efficient proximate cause in its response to the
Motion for Reconsideration, and acknowledged that efficient proximate cause is applicable by
arguing they drafted around it. R. 320-322. There would be no need to attempt to draft around
efficient proximate cause if it was not applicable to the insurance agreement.
Mid-Century’s argument that the issue was not preserved ultimately fails because the district
court addressed the issue in its Reconsideration Order, and therefore made it an appealable issue.
R. 339-340. As it was included in the district court’s order, efficient proximate cause was listed in
the Notice of Appeal and it was properly preserved for appeal. R. 344, Idaho Appellate Rule 11.
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E.

Efficient Proximate Cause Should be Considered in this Case As It Was in Burgess,
Jones and Erikson.
Mid-Century argues that Idaho has not adopted an efficient proximate cause analysis and

attempts to distinguish the instances when Idaho courts did consider efficient proximate cause.
Respondent’s Brief, p. 24-26. Mid-Century’s argument fails to acknowledge that in each case cited
the Idaho Court of Appeals was discussing and construing the application of insurance contracts and
principles that govern insurance contracts.
The court in Burgess Farms v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp. adopted efficient proximate cause
in interpreting coverage of an insurance contract purchased to protect a cellar of potatoes. Burgess
Farms v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp., 108 Idaho 831, 832, 702 P.2d 869, 870 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
The court was interpreting the policy’s term when it applied efficient proximate cause. 108 Idaho
at 833–35. The court did not limit efficient proximate cause’s application solely to malice and
intentional acts as Mid-Century argues. The analysis was necessary in considering the interpretation
of the insurance contract and how the insurance contract would be applied. After doing an efficient
proximate cause analysis the court of appeals stated “[w]e can only hold that the facts before us
cannot give rise to a presumption, but may give rise to an inference.” Burgess Farms v. New
Hampshire Ins. Grp., 108 Idaho at 836, (emphasis in original). They reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment because “[c]overage is dependent upon disputed facts and we thus
cannot say either that it is definitely covered or that it is not.” Id. at 875. The same analysis should
be conducted in this case, with the same result, a reversal of the district court.
8

Mid-Century is also mistaken in their interpretation of Jones v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 105 Idaho 520, 670 P.2d 1305 (Ct. App. 1983). The court of appeals also utilized efficient
proximate cause analysis in Jones and did so on the basis of the application of insurance law and
general contract interpretation. The Jones court concluded an efficient proximate cause was
necessary and came to that conclusion “not by a construction of ambiguous language, since we have
held that the language is unambiguous, but by the recognition that “sole cause” has a specialized
legal meaning, beyond its plain English meaning, in the application of insurance law.” Jones v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 105 Idaho 520, 526–27, 670 P.2d 1305, 1311–12 (Ct. App. 1983)
emphasis added. The Jones court continued:
In the spirit of liberal construction of insurance contracts, the “more modern” rule
regarding restrictive language in accident insurance policies defines the “sole cause”
standard to mean no more than that an accident must be the prime or moving cause
of the death or injury. Our own Supreme Court has used the phrase “dominant
cause.” Erikson v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 288, 292, 543 P.2d 841, 845
(1975). See also Goodwin v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 104 Idaho 74, 656 P.2d 135
(Ct.App.1982). This rule holds no matter how stringent the language of the policy.
Thus, where an insurance policy requires that an accident be the sole cause of death
or injury, a loss is still covered, even though a pre-existing disease may have
contributed to the loss, if the accident is the dominant cause.” 105 Idaho at 527,
some internal citations omitted.
The Jones court went on to discuss the case of Erikson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 97 Idaho
288 (1975) where the Supreme Court held the jury was properly instructed to find the “dominate
cause” of an insured injury. Jones v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 105 Idaho at 528–29. The
Jones court quoted the following from Erikson:
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“we believe that the mere fact that a latent disease or bodily infirmity exists prior to
accident, upon which the accident acts to precipitate the loss, will not defeat coverage
so long as the disease or infirmity appears as a passive ally and the accidental cause
predominates .... Seldom does a loss involve a sole cause independent of all other
causes as asserted by the appellant. Furthermore, we recognize that there is a plethora
of authority in other jurisdictions holding that language in insurance contracts
restricting coverage as does the policy here, nevertheless has no greater meaning
than the requirement that an accident must be the dominant cause of the injury
incurred or the active efficient cause that precipitated the resulting loss.” Jones v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 105 Idaho at 529; italicized emphasis as found in
Jones, bold emphasis added.
Ultimately the court in Jones held that the Plaintiff was required to show only that the
accident was the dominant cause of his injuries. 105 Idaho at 529.
The courts in Burgess, Jones, and Erikson all considered efficient proximate cause in
interpreting and discussing insurance contract theories. Each court found it necessary to do the
analysis. The same should occur in this case.
F.

Precluding Efficient Proximate Cause Analysis by Applying Anti-Concurrent
Causation Language as Mid-Century Argues Would be a Detriment to Idaho Insureds
The parties did not contract out of the efficient proximate cause rule as Mid-Century argues.

Respondent’s Brief, p. 28. Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co.
v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d 208, 211 (1999) (it is clear that insurance contracts are
contracts of adhesion). Legislatures and courts regularly act to protect the interests of those who fall
within their jurisdiction. Specifically with insurance contracts the Idaho legislature drafted statues
to protect the interest of insureds. I.C. § 41-514 (“to protect the interest of insureds, claimants,
ceding insurers and the public generally”). Idaho courts have also developed case law to protect the
10

interest of insureds. Insurance contracts are to be construed most favorably to the insured and in
such a manner as to provide full coverage for the indicated risks. Erikson v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company, 97 Idaho 288, 292, 543 P.2d 841, 845 (1975). It is also clear that Idaho “courts
do not sanction a construction of the insurer's language that will defeat the very purpose or object
of the insurance.” Id. Allowing anti-concurrent causation language and failing to adopt efficient
proximate cause would result in depletion of coverage for indicated risks and defeat the very purpose
of having insurance.
The question that needs to be answered in this or any case where insurance is denied, must
begin with an evaluation of what caused the loss. In this case it cannot be determined what
specifically caused the loss. Even Mid-Century has shifted their argument of what caused the loss.
Initially Mid-Century argued ABK’s loss was excluded based on faulty maintenance and wear and
tear. R. 64. The focus later switched to the surface water exclusion as issues of fact arose with
respect to faulty maintenance and wear and tear theory. Mid-Century argues against efficient
proximate cause analysis and for anti-concurrent causation language because it would allow them
to deny coverage without ever having to determine what specifically caused the loss.
ABK obtained an insurance contract in order to protect its business. As a contract of
adhesion ABK had no opportunity to draft around anti-concurrent causation language and should not
be subjected to such language because it defeats the purpose of having insurance to begin with. The
language of the insurance contract, as interpreted by Mid-Century, would preclude any coverage if
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even a single drop of surface water was involved. Such an interpretation does not protect coverage
and defeats the purpose of insurance. ABK’s situation as an insured is aggravating because they are
being denied coverage when no one can definitively say how water was able to infiltrate the tanks,
even after repairs were made, and after the tanks were tested for leaks. R. 118, 128-131, 227.
Requiring an efficient proximate cause analysis is consistent with the insured’s burden to
establish that an exclusion applies. Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 100,
103, 936 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). Applying efficient proximate cause analysis and
precluding anti-concurrent causation language is not re-writing the contract between the insurer and
insured. It gives an insured the protections they are entitled to by statute and case law. Applying the
analysis does not prohibit Mid-Century’s freedom to contract to insure limited causes of loss. MidCentury can exclude coverage resulting from surface water or weather, so long as those excluded
perils are the predominate cause of loss.
Efficient proximate cause analysis and prohibition of anti-concurrent causation protects Idaho
insureds from unscrupulous insurance companies taking advantage through contracts of adhesion.
As there needed to be an analysis done in this case, and the district court failed to do so, the district
court committed an error that should be reversed.
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G.

It is Error to Dismiss the Bad Faith Claim When Questions of Fact Remain
The trial court's determination to dismiss the bad faith claims was based on the error that an

exclusion applies. If there remains a question of whether or not an exclusion applies, there remains
a question of whether Mid-Century committed bad faith in denying a covered claim. Because the
district court erred in determining that coverage was excluded, its dismissal of the bad faith claim
based on the finding of no coverage was improper.

II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff ABK asks the Court to reverse the district court and
set the case for trial.
Respectfully Submitted this April 18, 2019.
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS
& SHELDON, PLLC

/S/ DOUGLAS DICK
Douglas Dick
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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